Preventing
Socio-Technological Disasters in an Era of Rapid Globalization
Case Studies:
Bhopal and Challenger
Benjamin O'Connor
November 19th 1997
STS-011 assignment #2
"Whom
unmerciful Disaster
Followed fast
and followed faster"
-Edgar Allan Poe, The Raven
Report to
Congress by Benjamin O'Connor -- Corporate Public Relations and ethics
consultant
It has been said that those who do
not learn from the past are doomed to repeat it. Two "events" of the last decade may
serve to exemplify that rule: the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger on
the morning of January 28th 1986 and the release of deadly gas from
a Union Carbide factory in Bhopal, India on December 3rd 1984. I believe that both of these disasters
possibly could have been prevented, and it is our duty as responsible citizens
to take actions such that similar technological disasters do not happen in our
future. Our country must work with others to improve the safety of potentially
dangerous technological endeavors and enforce not only corporate
responsibility, but also ethical behavior of corporations. Fatal flaws in management and authority
structures, problems in the interactions between the scientifically minded
engineers and political managerial systems, and lack of ethical consideration
are at least partially to blame for both of these events as well as others like
them.
One disturbing pattern that we see
in both the Challenger and Bhopal disasters is that interaction between the
workers and engineers and management entities was ineffective. The logical, scientific reasoning of certain
scientists, unfortunately, did not agree with or change the opinions of the
management. Workers in the Union Carbide
factory were full aware of the gross negligence on the part of the
management. Frequently, plant systems
were modified, safety measures were cut back and the salary and skill of the
workforce was declining. Workers'
concerns, however, were met with nothing but opposition from all sources --
particularly management:
"Through
the workers union, the problems that plant operators were having with pollution
within the plant were raised with management.
Letters were sent to the managers of the plant, as well as to the
Ministry of Labor of the Government of Madhya Pradesh and the factory
inspector. All our letters went
unanswered…"(Chouhan 27)
In the face of workers becoming ill and increased
accidents and warnings of further disaster, the management continued its
deceptive practices. Workers were
offered early retirement, shifted to other parts of the plant, or fired
altogether. The workers' concerns about
the safety of the factory also went unheeded by the residents of the poor
villages nearest to the factory. A
combination of improperly maintained equipment, inexperienced and improperly
trained workers, and faulty plant design and modifications caused what many say
is the world's worst industrial disaster on December 3rd 1984. 40 Tons of poisonous methyl isocyanate (MIC)
gas was released from the plant and spread through the neighboring communities
killing as many as 4,000 people and permanently injuring thousands more. The Bhopal disaster is a clear example of how
industry in developing countries can be callous about human risk as well as
environmental damage.
A
similar scenario, of employees attempting to communicate concerns with a
management that seems concerned with the bottom line and not with ethical
responsibility played out at Morton Thiokol leading up to the Challenger
disaster. The shuttle was scheduled to
be launched in unusually cold weather on January 28th, 1986. Engineers familiar with the design of the
o-ring system that held the shuttle's solid rocket boosters together had some
evidence and believed that the o-rings could quite possibly fail in such cold
circumstances. Roger Boisjoly, one such
engineer, consistently raised arguments with upper management at Morton
Thiokol, the contractor for the SRB (solid rocket booster) on the shuttle. A task team was formed to deal with the
problems of the seals' performances at low temperatures. On the evening before the launch, management
conveyed the engineers' decision not to launch in such cold weather to NASA
officials. However, the decision did not
stay that way. Motivations of the
management apparently pushing towards a launch eventually forced out the
opinions of Boisjoly. He says: "our
general manager, Jerry Mason, said in a soft voice 'We have to make a
management decision.' I became furious
when I heard this because I knew that an attempt would be made by management to
reverse our recommendation not to launch." (Boisjoly 9) Such an attempt was indeed made, and
succeeded in the shuttle launching the next morning destined for a disaster in
which seven people lost their lives. A
number of things could have motivated the managerial decision to launch despite
warnings from engineers. The American
Space Shuttle program was racked with delays.
Further delay would have been costly, in terms of money and public
opinion. The management took the position
of balancing human life against a so-called "acceptable risk."
In
the investigation following the disaster, it became clear that Morton Thiokol
management was attempting to cover itself.
Until all diversions were exhausted, Morton Thiokol avoided the
possibility of a temperature-related o-ring failure because it would clearly
mean that they were wrong, and the engineers' advice not to launch should have
been heeded. Roger Boisjoly was given a
back seat of sorts to the management opinions in the Presidential Commission
hearings following the disaster. Tense
feelings were noticeable between management and those employees who testified.
Boisjoly says:
"Apparently
Morton Thiokol management had plenty of notice concerning this meeting since
they had the publications group prepare a formal set of viewgraphs … I had
approximately two hours total by myself and was struggling to organize a set of
notes to aid me during my testimony.
After the testimony there were obvious tense feelings between Morton Thiokol
management and those who testified, namely, myself, Al McDonald and Arnie
Thompson."(Boisjoly 10)
After the testimony, those engineer
"whistle-blowers" were shuffled around the corporation and put in,
according to them, positions of less influence.
This shouldn't be the reward for personal responsibility on the part of
the whistle-blowing worker.
The
greatest cost of the Challenger incident turned out to be crippling the shuttle
program and the death of those onboard the shuttle. It has taken over 10 years to get the program
launching at the same rate as before the launch. The effects of the Bhopal incident, however,
were much different. The poisonous
methyl isocyanate gas (MIC) leak affected thousands. Some estimates say that 4000 died and thousands
more were injured, with permanent respiratory ailments, as well as
blindness. People were trampled as they
left the area in confusion, having no idea why death had settled upon so many
of them. "Parents watched their
children die; children watched their parents die."(Chouhan 40) Union Carbide soon went into
"cover-up" mode, trying to avoid the imminent public relations
disaster. Because of Union Carbide's early
attempts to downplay the incident and maintain the corporate secrecy of their
chemicals and formulae, antidotes were not readily available. Their CEO, Warren Anderson, quickly
disappeared from the public eye. An
official corporate theory was put forward that the disaster was not really
caused by improper manufacturing conditions and irresponsible policies, but was
sabotage. Evidence and eyewitness
accounts clearly support otherwise. Long
term effects of exposure are still unknown, and victims continue to suffer. Birth defects as well as spontaneous
abortions have been reported.
Although
an incident like Bhopal should foster general corporate responsibility and
promote ethical risk avoidance strategies in other multi-national corporations,
many would say that it taught the opposite.
The settlement that the government of India made with Union Carbide to
provide for the victims was a mere slap on the wrist and was, in reality,
letting the corporation get away with murder.
The settlement for $470 million dollars for the death of up to 4000
people and the disability of as many as 50,000 more is not adequate. The Indian government was quite unwilling to
send the "wrong message" to other companies that could consider
investing and locating in India. The corrupt
and inefficient Indian government was unable to fairly distribute the $470
million settlement, and it is suspected that much of the money went to line the
pockets of government officials. The
disaster victims are frustrated, and were in many cases unable to receive
quality medical attention. Rather then
send the message that corporations should be held responsible for pollution and
accidents in any country, it became acceptable to build dangerous plants in
developing countries where they could pollute as much as they wanted. The following is an excerpt from Gary Cohen's
article marking the tenth anniversary of the Bhopal "massacre:"
"Just
as the Indian government can not, and will not, hold Union Carbide officials
accountable for their murder of Bhopal residents, so the Mexican government
will not hold General Motors Corporation accountable for poisoning the border
region, the Malaysian government will not hold Mitsubishi Corporation
accountable for poisoning the residents of Bukit Merah with radiation, the
Brazilian government will not hold Rhone Poulenc Corporation accountable for poisoning
the people of Brazil, the U.S. government will not hold Chemical Waste
Management accountable for poisoning the African American community in South
Chicago, and so on and so on around the globe."
Gary Cohen, The Bhopal Union Carbide Massacre: A Tenth Anniversary Call
to Action
After the disaster, groups and individuals fought for changes
in corporate practices and the law. One
result of this disaster was the concept of a "Right to know" about
the hazards of a corporation's operations.
However, while this is a right for those of us in developed countries
such as the United States, it is not enforced in India. Although internationally incomplete, it was a
step in the right direction. Public
right to know is an important first step to any country making its citizens
aware of and reducing toxic chemicals and dangerous situations arising from
corporate irresponsibility and general lack of ethical considerations.
It is evident that many things can and should be done to
prevent such technological disasters in the future. First of all, personal responsibility and
ethics must be fostered. Presently, the
law does not offer whistle-blowers very much protection. Laws should be passed that prohibit employers
from retaliating against employees who report violations. Good managerial relations with employees can
also allow for employees contributing to decision-making. Good training and job-security is also at
issue, as T.R. Chouhan (an employee at the Union Carbide factory in Bhopal)
points out: "Workers cannot fulfill their responsibilities beyond their
own workplace if they are continually threatened with termination … job
security must not be in question."(Chouhan 24) To attain this goal, much progress needs to
be made in the very structure of large corporations. A "top-down" management pyramid
structure hampers employee involvement.
Corporations need to draw on the collective ideas and concerns of an
entire workforce, cut down on bureaucracy and increase worker satisfaction and
therefore productivity. Such
"flatland" models of corporate structure need to be implemented in
the future. Treating employees more
humanely will foster responsibility, on the employees' part, toward the welfare
of the corporation as well as the community.
One issue
that contributed to the Bhopal disaster, and not the Challenger disaster, was
the multi-national characteristic of the disaster. Union Carbide was able to get away with a
relatively small settlement because it was dealing with a sympathetic Indian
government, and not the American justice system. This is consistently the case when companies
locate plants in countries with lax or nonexistent rules concerning pollution
and right to know. Many see this as the
brutal face of 'free trade' and industrialization in the world today. National governments lose authority to these
transnational corporations who tend to value their profit margin more then
environmental and human values and ethics.
We need to learn from this disaster to prevent such inhumanities and
tragedies in the future, when even more multi-national corporations will exist
supported by trade agreements in this now "global" economy of
ours. Continued efforts to enact
environmental responsibility legislation are needed to hold corporations
responsible for the chemicals they put into our atmosphere and into our
lungs. In order to make these ideals
global, some international enforcement and consensus is needed.
Finally, and most importantly of all, personal ethics of the
non-management-minded employee should combine with the agendas of the
management. This just might promote
further corporate responsibility.
"Corporate Responsibility" is, after all, only the sum of all
the personal responsibility and ethical decisions that make up those in the
corporation.