Too Many Secrets:
Withholding
Information in the Atomic Age
Benjamin O'Connor
October 15th 1997
STS-011 assignment #1
"For ye shall know the
truth,
and the truth shall set you free."
(CIA Motto, The Bible - John
8:32)
A major point of discussion
concerning the Manhattan Project is who knew "the truth" and whom
"the truth" was kept from.
National Security, the "best interest" of American citizens
and soldiers, and in general the success of this unprecedented scientific,
political and military project all depended on secrets. The entire project itself was kept secret
from the American citizens and, for the most part, the rest of the world. Russia was especially cut out of the
"loop". Complete and accurate
details concerning the effect and aftermath of the bombing were lacking, and it
took years for America as a whole to truly understand the fury it had unleashed
upon the earth.
So just who posed the greatest
threat to this country's future? Was it
the Japanese, or the Russians, who most caused the "need" for the use
of the atomic bomb? The role of Russia
certainly should not be underestimated in this international drama of secrecy
and destruction, even though at the time Russia was still technically our
ally. Nobody outside this country was
aware of the innermost details of the Manhattan Project. We shared some information with our closest
ally, England, and British science played a role in some early parts of the
project. Russia, on the other hand, was
kept completely in the dark. It is
precisely this secrecy with Russia that led to the nuclear arms race that was a
running theme during the cold war. This
could have been avoided, or lessened, had some different decisions been made
concerning keeping our atomic secrets from the Russians. Niels Bohr, for instance, was in favor of
open negotiations and disclosure concerning the use and future control of
atomic weapons. His effort was to avoid
a dangerous arms race and downright frightening world condition. Bohr believed, "International control of
atomic energy was only possible in an 'open world,' a world in which each
nation could be confident that no potential enemy was engaged in stockpiling
atomic weapons." (Sherwin, 94) These
efforts, shared by other scientists, and science advisors to Roosevelt and
later to Truman, were opposed by deeply ingrained political and military
goals. Instead of international control
and cooperation, it was perceived that an American monopoly on these weapons of
mass destruction would be a bargaining chip that could be used to further our
post-war ambitions, and to stifle those of the communist Soviet Union. The administration, "consistently
opposed international control and acted in accordance with Churchill's
monopolistic, anti-Soviet views."(Sherwin, p. 7)
The scientists working in the
Chicago laboratories of the project were especially vocal about certain points
concerning the use of the bomb, and the post-war implications. Free exchange of science and ideas was needed
to control the use of atomic weapons in the future, they believed. It was also suggested to the president that
he should briefly mention to the Soviet Union in some way, without giving away
any serious national secrets, that the United States is working on an atomic
weapon, and that it may be used against Japan.
This exchange, however, was not effective at Potsdam, at least not enough
to prevent the downward spiral of the cold war arms race. Wartime secrecy did indeed give America an
advantage over the Soviet Union, but only for a short time. The Soviet Union developed an atomic bomb by 1949
and later a Hydrogen bomb, more powerful than an A-bomb by orders of
magnitude. The Anglo-American atomic
monopoly was no more. Instead of
cooperation with the Soviet Union in controlling and preventing the development
and use of these weapons, secrecy had created the theme of atomic
competition. The Soviet Union and the
United States would have increasing numbers of atomic weapons pointed at each
other for many years to come.
I believe
that being open with the rest of the world, to at least a greater degree than
we were, would have lessened or prevented the nuclear arms race
altogether. Our burning desire to
"not let the Russians know" led to a distrust of those like Niels
Bohr who argued for arms control rather than domination. On his distrust of Bohr, Churchill states,
concerning his discussions with President Roosevelt at Hyde Park, "Enquiries
should be made…regarding the activities of Professor Bohr and steps taken to
ensure that he is responsible for no leakage of information particularly to the
Russians."(Sherwin, 110) If,
instead of this secrecy and paranoia, a degree of information exchange with the
Soviet Union occurred, international cooperation would have much sooner been a
reality. With international cooperation
and understanding about these new weapons, the world would have been more ready
to deal with the post-war consequences of their use. Control would have been possible if all
countries were at the atomic bargaining table.
Instead, Russia was left out and an arms race ensued. On the other hand, the use of the atomic bomb
on Japan without Russia's involvement prevented Russia from taking part in the
future of southeastern Asia as much as it did in eastern Europe. For a short time, Russia did "play
ball." Or perhaps they just weren't
invited to "play" at all. Japan
was clearly not partitioned in the way Germany was at the end of the war
because the Soviets never entered the war in Japan. This, however is weighed against the
arguments against this secrecy, and the giant mushroom cloud shadow that would
hover over cold-war politics and culture for many years to come. Each side upped its firepower aiming to amass
enough nuclear weapons to frighten its rival out of using them. The arms race gave human beings the ability
to exterminate humanity and more recently, played a role in bankrupting the
Soviet Union.
"Discoveries of which the
people of the United States are not aware may affect the welfare of this nation
in the near future." So opens the
Chicago Scientists' Petition to the President on July 17th 1945. An important thing to realize about wartime
atomic diplomacy and policy was that it was the sole responsibility of the
United States government, and groups of scientists who were working on the atomic
bomb could advise. Just about everything
concerning atomic energy was kept secret from the American public until it was
publicly stated that the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were in fact
atomic in nature. The general conscience
of the citizen never played any role in the decisions leading up to the
development and eventual use of atomic weapons. Congress didn't even play an
extremely important role in shaping American atomic policy. As a result, the decisions were based on the military,
political, and personal beliefs and opinions of those in power. It is to these practical concerns of the
administration that the general moral issues concerning atomic warfare took a
back seat.
The scientists
who, in more instances than the politicians and military, showed general moral
concern for the future of the world were also not given the "full
story" in many cases. At first
glance, the scientists didn't need to know about the Japanese military
condition, or American plans to invade Japan, but once they started advising
and influencing the administration on atomic policy, a further understanding of
the world situation would have been helpful.
Oppenheimer described this: "we didn't know beans…about the Japanese
situation -- the reports on Japanese morale, the plans for more fire-bombings
of Japanese cities, and the date for the scheduled American invasion." (From
reading: Bernstein, 238) And of course,
the question arises, if the scientists working on the Manhattan Project had had
more freedom to know details about the bomb, its use, and had been free to
discuss their concern with each other, would the ethics of the scientists have
caused them to doubt the project they were involved in? Just how much of the project was being kept
secret from the scientists working at Los Alamos, and the other labs involved
in the Manhattan Project, we may never know for sure. But it is clear that measures were taken by
the military, in spite of opposition by the scientists, to cut down on the
dissemination of unnecessary scientific information relating to the project
between scientists. These measures included
compartmentalization -- each scientist focused on only his work. Scientists were opposed to this on basic
scientific principle. Science is
supposed to be disseminated, talked about, debated and refined. This was perhaps exacerbated by Grove's
"difficult personality."
"If he did make an effort to hide his distaste for scientists'
attitudes and his low opinion of their reliability, he failed in the
attempt." (Sherwin, 59) Even
Oppenheimer complained about this compartmentalization questioning it's
effects: "background of our work is so complicated and information in the
past has been so highly compartmentalized, that it seems we shall have a good
deal to gain from a leisurely and thorough discussion." (Sherwin, 61) Hence, the principle of free scientific
inquiry was somewhat diminished. Groves'
purpose, of course, was that the scientists would work faster and more
efficiently if they kept to their own concerns, and did not spread themselves
on other portions of the project they shouldn't be concerned with. It is hard to say whether this worked
however, since the science of the Manhattan Project was highly interrelated at
some points and lack of free discussion may have in fact slowed down work that
would have otherwise been helped by collaboration. One can only be led to believe that this is
perhaps just one of many consequences of mixing science military politics --
science and secrecy just don't mix. This
compartmentalization had the original purpose of combating espionage, but later
on it also had another side effect: it restricted the discussions of the
scientists concerning the implications of what they were building. It was only through Oppenheimer's persistent
argument that scientists were able to hold their series of weekly
"colloquiums" at Los Alamos dealing with such issues. In the end, it turns out that while Groves'
security procedures may have stifled the scientists' collaboration on moral
issues, it was ultimately less effective against its original purpose of
preventing espionage -- spies were in their midst.
When the
American public was made aware of this new, Atomic weapon, the whole story was
still quite far behind. A White House
press release following the bombing of Hiroshima stated that the bomb was
dropped, "on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base." While the military importance of Hiroshima is
debatable, one thing is for certain: nothing is said about the civilians
disintegrated along with soldiers and materials of war. This is an example of the propaganda the
government spread about the use of the atomic bomb. Nobody was told the full story of the effects
of the bomb for many years to come.
American occupation of Japan held tight restrictions on just about
anything that had anything to do with the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
and their aftermath. Figures of deaths
and casualties were underestimated, and not reported fully for decades. Pictures and video of the bombsites were
prohibited. Those that existed were
confiscated and destroyed. All of this was
to keep secret from just about everyone the true effects, and horror, of the
atomic bomb. Even as workers working on
the cleanup and reconstruction of the cities were falling ill with radiation
burns and sickness, the effects of the radiation caused by the bomb were denied,
and concealed.
This distorted view is what shaped
Americans' immediate post-war attitudes about the bomb. For a while after the war, people saw neither
the horror of the killing of a city of civilians, nor the post-war consequences
of the existence of such a weapon of mass destruction. Support for the use of atomic weapons was the
topic of many newspaper and magazine editorials and articles, further enabling
the propaganda machine to ensure public support of the governments decisions
and policies.
These
policies eventually grew to include atomic testing in the deserts of the
American West. The far-reaching physiological effects of en
atomic explosion were concealed from the American public, and underestimated up
to recent times. The fallout clouds and
radiation from the many atmospheric tests carried out are said by some scientists
and activists to affect most American's up to today. "Downwinders" is the name given to
the group of people most directly affected by atomic testing -- those that live
in the wind pattern surrounding the Nevada test site. These people have been most afflicted by
diseases associated with fallout and radiation exposures. Many are affected, have died, or are dying
from various forms of cancer that can be attributed to these atomic tests.
Seven major
test series were conducted in the decade of the 1950's. During this time almost
100 atmospheric detonations of atomic devices occurred; 100 brilliant flashes
burned into the sky, and 100 dangerous radioactive cloud patterns drifted away
from ground zero. Due to the ever-changing wind currents, poor weather forecasting,
or operator-carelessness, almost thirty percent of the radioactive debris from
the atomic bombs moved over these towns that lay east of the Nevada Test Site. The
Downwinders, over 100,000 men, women, and children, were scattered in the
states of Arizona, Nevada, and Utah. Although they were shocked and frightened,
at times, about the atomic blasts, many of these townspeople believed that the
testing was very important for the country's self-defense. Therefore while they
wished that the testing was done else where, they managed to carry out their
lives as usual (or so they thought). In fact many people welcomed the testing.
The latest
reports from the National Cancer Institute states that as many as 75,000 cases
of thyroid cancer in this country were caused by atomic testing:
Downwinders
also called for a presidential confession and apology for the deliberate harm
inflicted on unsuspecting, patriotic Americans and their children under the
guise of Cold War necessity. "Our government knew damn well what they were
doing and what the consequences would be when they exploded the bombs. The lies
they told to protect their own self-interests, and to keep on testing, should
be proof enough. It is time we as a nation stop making excuses for them, and
time to call it what it is. Let's admit it, identify the guilty, provide help
and comfort for the injured, and move on,"
(Downwinders' response to released Government Fallout reports,
http://www.downwinders.org/nci_pr.htm)
Atomic testing is also opposed in general as an arms control
issue. People don't want these weapons
to be tested, because they don’t ever want to see them used, on us or on anyone
else ever again. The secrets that the
government kept about the effects of the atomic bomb fostered public opinion in
the positive direction about the incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Secrets the government kept about atomic
testing and the effects of radiation and fallout may have greatly increased
cancer cases in this country due to irresponsible atomic testing. The unwillingness, or inability, of our
government to come to an agreement of disclosure, rather than secrets, with the
Soviet Union led to the buildup of tremendous stockpiles of these weapons of
mass destruction. At any moment during
the Cold War, enough atomic firepower existed to destroy human civilization
many times over. Furthermore, because the
Manhattan Project was kept secret from the American public, and scientists were
discouraged and prevented from discussing the moral implications of the Atomic
bomb, it is possible that the ethics in the decisions leading up to the
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were severely limited -- if present at
all.